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The prosecutorial stage is in many respects the linchpin of the criminal justice system. (Thomas & 
Fitch, 1976, p. 509).   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Scholars agree that the American prosecutor possesses a great amount of discretion (see Albonetti, 1987; Kersetter, 
1990; Thomas & Fitch, 1976).  Scholars also agree that such discretion has the potential to result in discrimination in 
the form of unwarranted disparity2 (Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 2000).  American prosecutors use their discretion to 
make initial charging decisions, to seek the death penalty, and to negotiate plea agreements.   
 
One of the most profound and frequently studied issues in the American criminal justice system is racial 
discrimination.  Research indicates that Black offenders are disproportionately represented in prison populations 
(Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, & Tonry, 1983; Walker, et al., 2000).  Although Black citizens only represent 13% of 
the U.S. population, they represent 45% of the incarcerated population in state and federal prisons (Harrison & 
Beck, 2003).  On its face, Blumstein and his associates (1983) suggested that the overrepresentation of certain 
groups in prison populations may be a direct result of disparate treatment at sentencing.  One argument Blumstein 
and his colleagues (1983) proffered, though, was that some of the racial disparity in prison populations might be 
attributed to a cumulative effect, whereby discretionary decisions at each stage contributed to the overall 
                                                 
1
 Please address any comments and questions to Jeremy D. Ball at the following ADDRESS:  Department of 
Criminal Justice Administration, Boise State University, 1910 University Drive, Boise, ID  83725-1955  PHONE:  
(208) 426-3769  FAX:  (208) 426-4371  E-MAIL:  jeremyball@boisestate.edu 
2
 Some disparity is warranted.  For example, a defendant with a more serious charge is likely to be treated 
differently than a defendant with a less serious charge.  Disparity is only unwarranted if decisions rely on legally 
irrelevant factors including, but not limited to, race/ethnicity, sex, age, and/or employment status of the offender. 
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overrepresentation of racial minorities in prison (Blumstein, et al., 1983).  Wilmot and Spohn (2004) argued that 
plea bargaining decisions which can play an important role in court processing.  The current research project 
attempts to examine potential disparate treatment in one of these prior stages – the plea bargaining stage. 
 
Research conducted on the decision points between arrest and sentencing is scarce.  Albonetti (1990) noted that 
previous research failed to focus on racial/ethnic differences in the processing of defendants.  Much research 
focused on outcome decisions such as bail and sentencing but not on processing decisions such as whether the case 
went to trial or pled guilty.  There is a need for research to examine earlier decision points such as initial charging 
and subsequent reduction of the number of charges.  Few studies have examined unwarranted disparity in plea 
bargaining decisions, and most of the existing studies on plea bargaining are qualitative in nature, explaining how 
plea negotiations are processed rather than the determinants of these decisions.  Even more remotely studied plea 
bargaining practices are the decisions to reduce the number of charges; research on plea bargaining often examines 
the reduction of the severity of charges.  The current research provides a quantitative approach to the examination of 
the effect of offender characteristics on the prosecutor’s decision to reduce the number of charges – a phenomenon 
understudied.   
 
Effect of Offender Characteristics on Court Processing 
Court research on disparate treatment of particular defendants typically focused on charging or sentencing decisions 
(see Spohn & Beichner, 2000; Spohn & Cederblom, 1991; Spohn & Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 
2000; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998).  Research on prosecutors’ plea bargaining decisions has not 
experienced the same vigor and attention.  Decisions by prosecutors can impact later decisions (e.g., bail and 
sentencing) (see Johnson, 2003; Kellough & Wortley, 2002; Wilmot & Spohn, 2004).  Wooldredge and 
Thistlethwaite (2004) found that earlier decisions by the prosecutor (i.e., charging decisions) result in more 
favorable dispositions in domestic violence cases for suspects who face greater social and financial disadvantage yet 
less favorable at the conviction and/or sentencing stage for these same defendants.  It is important, therefore, to 
address potential unwarranted disparities in these earlier decisions such as plea bargaining. 
 
Defendants’ Decisions to Plead Guilty 
Research on plea bargaining has centered around two important decisions:  the decision to plead guilty and the 
decision to reduce charges.  Most research has indicated that those defendants who took their cases to trial – that is, 
they did not plead guilty – received harsher penalties (see Brereton & Casper, 1981-1982; Britt, 2000).  The most 
important influences on the likelihood of pleading guilty have been the severity of the current offense and the length 
and severity of the prior record (Meyer & Gray, 1997).  Studies also found, however, that Black defendants and 
male defendants were the least likely to plead guilty (Albonetti, 1990; Kellough & Wortley, 2002; LaFree, 1985).  A 
higher proportion of Black defendants and Hispanic defendants took their cases to trial than the proportion of white 
defendants even though the majority of the cases concluded with a negotiated guilty plea (Johnson, 2003).  Albonetti 
(1990) argued that Black defendants, who were more likely to distrust the system, would have expressed this distrust 
by not pleading guilty and taking their case to a jury trial.   
 
Race and ethnicity is not the only offender characteristic that affects guilty plea decisions.  A few studies have 
acknowledged a relationship between sex of the offender and the likelihood of pleading guilty (Figuiera-
McDonough, 1985; Johnson, 2003).  Age of the offender, however, has produced mixed results (Kellough & 
Wortley, 2002; LaFree, 1985).   
 
Prosecutors’ Decisions to Reduce Charges 
Inexorably linked to defendants’ decisions to plead guilty have been the decisions to reduce the severity of charges 
in order to secure guilty pleas.3  With the advent of formalized sentencing procedures came greater discretion 
displaced to the prosecutor.  Although there was an increase in the amount of charge reductions given, Wooldredge 
and Griffin (2005) found that not one particular racial and/or gender group benefited from the greater discretionary 
power given to the prosecutors.   
 
 
                                                 
3
 To date, there are no studies that examine the determinants of the decision to reduce the number of charges – or, 
count reduction. 
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Research indicated strong influence of seriousness of the current offense and prior record on the decision to reduce 
the severity of charges (see McDonald, 1985; Meyer & Gray, 1997).  Although the seriousness of the current offense 
and prior record were the most important influences in determining charge reductions, a substantial amount of 
research found that offender characteristics also influenced charge reductions (see Albonetti, 1992; Bernstein, Kick, 
Leung, & Schulz, 1977; Farnworth & Teske, 1995; Figueira-McDonough, 1985; LaFree, 1980; McDonald, 1985; 
Miethe & Moore, 1986; Voit, 1987).   
 
The research on the effect of offender characteristics on the charge reduction decision has been mixed.  Bernstein 
and her associates (1977) found that White defendants were more likely to receive favorable charge reductions 
compared to Black defendants.  Albonetti (1992) found that younger defendants and male defendants were less 
likely to receive reduced charges than older defendants and female defendants, respectively.  Farnworth and Teske 
(1995) found that young, Black male defendants were less likely than other defendants to have their initial charges 
reduced (Farnworth & Teske, 1995).  With these mixed results, it is important to clearly identify any potential 
unwarranted disparities in plea bargaining decisions based on legally-irrelevant offender characteristics.  
 
An Integrated Theoretical Perspective 
The courtroom behaves as its own separate community with shared workloads, interdependent relationships, and 
organizational cultures where particular goals – formal and informal – may be realized (Eisenstein, Flemming, & 
Nardulli, 1998; Ulmer, 1997).  The term plea bargaining evokes images of backroom deals and protracted haggling 
between the prosecutor and the defense attorney, with each side attempting to get the best possible “deal.”  Nardulli, 
Eisenstein, and Flemming (1988) contended that there are two different conceptions, or models, of the guilty plea 
process that “differ fundamentally in their answer to one key question, what makes the plea process work?” (p. 205).  
One model, which they called the “concessions” model, suggests that negotiating a guilty plea resembles the give-
and-take in a Turkish bazaar where prosecutors induce guilty pleas by offering defendants genuine concessions in 
the form of reduced charges or agreements for more lenient sentences.  According to this view of the guilty plea 
process, “charging manipulations and sentencing concessions grease the wheels of justice” (Nardulli et al., 1988, p. 
205). 
 
The other model of the guilty plea process, which Nardulli et al. (1988) referred to as the “consensus model,” 
suggests that the wheels of justice are greased, not by concessions to the defendant, but by agreements regarding 
appropriate sentences that are shared by the members of the courtroom workgroup.  Nardulli et al., in other words, 
suggested that prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges share conceptions of the “going rate” (Heumann, 1978; 
Ulmer & Kramer, 1998; Walker, 1998) or “normal penalty” (Sudnow, 1965) for specific types of defendants and 
crimes; similar cases, and similarly situated defendants, receive similar outcomes.  As Nardulli et al. (1988) noted, 
“going rates . . . bind the plea discussions in a given county and provide a measure of predictability to sentencing 
that renders the machinations implicit in the concessions model unnecessary, even futile, for most cases” (p. 206).   
 
Another difference between these two models of the guilty plea process is the amount of discretion that prosecutors 
retain in negotiating guilty pleas.  The consensus model, with its emphasis on shared conceptions of going rates, 
implies a certain amount of certainty and consistency in the charging and sentencing processes.  The discretion of 
prosecutors operating under this model is constrained by the expectations of the other members of the courtroom 
workgroup.  In contrast, the concessions model, with its emphasis on explicit negotiation between the prosecutor and 
the defense, suggests that charging and plea bargaining decisions are more variable and less predictable.  
Prosecutors have wide discretion to negotiate guilty pleas and, thus, the value of the concessions granted to 
defendants is highly variable.  It is suggested, therefore, that the plea bargaining decisions of prosecutors operating 
within a consensus framework – with less opportunity for discretion – are determined primarily by legally relevant 
factors such as the seriousness of the charge and the strength of the evidence, while the decisions of prosecutors 
operating under a concessions model are affected by a combination of legally relevant and legally irrelevant factors.   
 
These propositions also are consistent with the liberation hypothesis, which was first developed by Kalven and 
Zeisel (1966) to explain jury behavior and later adapted to sentencing decisions by Spohn and Cederblom (1991).  
Spohn and Cederblom (1991) argued that appropriate sentences are clearly determined in more serious cases by the 
severity of the current offense and the defendants’ criminal history – that is, the legally relevant variables (Spohn & 
Cederblom, 1991).  In these cases, particular sentences are clearly justified and leave little room for judicial  
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discretion to consider legally irrelevant variables.  On the other hand, in less serious cases the appropriate sentences 
are not clearly determined by legally relevant factors and leave more room for discretion to rely on legally irrelevant 
factors (Spohn & Cederblom, 1991).  In other words, judges feel liberated from the restrictions of using only legally 
relevant factors. 
 
Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski (1990), though, had a different approach to explaining judicial discretion in capital 
sentencing decisions.  They suggested that there are three culpability categories of seriousness upon which the 
liberated hypothesis may be applied.  They suggested that judges feel liberated to use more discretion in capital 
cases at the middle level of culpability where sentencing decisions are less determined and less discretion in capital 
cases at the lowest level and the highest level of culpability where sentencing decisions are more determined.   
 
The notion of disparity in plea bargaining decisions might be consistent with the focal concerns perspective, where 
judges have incomplete information about defendants and their cases and, thus, rely on a “perceptual shorthand” to 
which they apply their own biases and interject stereotypes regarding the dangerousness of a particular offender 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Spohn, Beichner, & Davis-Frenzel, 2001).  Steffensmeier and his colleagues (1998) 
suggested that these stereotypes are linked to race, sex, and age of the offender and result in the perception that 
young, black, male offenders are the most dangerous class of offenders; Spohn and Holleran (2001) proposed that 
unemployed offenders are also perceived as dangerous. 
 
The Current Study 
The current study integrates these theoretical perspectives to examine the potential disparate treatment of particular 
defendants in count bargaining decisions.  It is suggested that the degree to which plea bargains reflect concessions 
rather than consensus depends upon the seriousness of the case and may be affected by the prosecutor’s perception 
of dangerousness.  Although Baldus et al. (1990) used a three-tier distinction for high severity cases – that is capital 
cases – the current study utilizes a similar three-tiered distinction for all seriousness levels of felony cases for very 
different reasons, integrating the concessions/consensus models.  Consistent with the liberation hypothesis (Baldus 
et al., 1990), it is argued that prosecutors’ plea bargain decisions will reflect consensus in the most serious and the 
least serious cases.  In these types of cases, the members of the courtroom workgroup will be in general agreement 
regarding the appropriate disposition of the case.  For the more serious cases, it is hypothesized that plea bargaining 
is used to ensure a conviction for the prosecutor and reduce the severity of the sentence for the defense attorney.  For 
the least serious cases, it is hypothesized that plea bargaining is used to reduce caseloads for both parties regardless 
of the defendant’s individual characteristics.  In the “borderline” serious cases, there will be more disagreement 
between the prosecutor and the defense attorney regarding the outcome of the case.  As a result of this disagreement, 
there will be more explicit bargaining – and, thus, more genuine concessions – in these borderline serious cases.  
 
If, as suggested above, implicit bargaining (or, consensus) characterizes the most serious and the least serious cases 
while explicit bargaining (or, concessions) characterizes the borderline serious cases, then prosecutors have more 
discretion and, thus, more opportunities to consider legally irrelevant offender characteristics in the borderline 
serious cases – namely, race/ethnicity, sex, age, and employment status of the offender.  It is hypothesized, 
therefore, that the impact of offender characteristics on plea bargaining decisions will be evident in the borderline 
serious cases yet have no effect in the least serious or most serious cases (see Figure 1).  Because young, Black, 
unemployed male offenders are stereotyped as the most dangerous class of offender (see, Steffensmeier, et al., 1998; 
Spohn, at al., 2001; Spohn & Holleran, 2001), it is hypothesized that young, Black (and Hispanic), male, offenders 
who are unemployed will be less likely to receive count reductions than other offenders in borderline serious cases.  
This same effect will not be found in the most serious and least serious cases.   
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Much of the research on the effect of individual characteristics on decisions in the courtroom focused on sentencing 
decisions.  Few researchers have examined the effect of these characteristics on prosecutorial decisions – especially, 
plea bargaining decisions.  The majority of research focusing on plea bargaining was conducted in the 1970s and 
1980s and has been relatively neglected in the last 25 years in favor of analyses of sentencing outcomes.  The lack of 
research on plea bargaining practices is probably largely driven by the ease of analysis of readily available 
sentencing data sources in the past 25 years.  Thus, this paper fills a neglected gap in the current research.   
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Illinois Classification Scheme 
For the purposes of this current study, it is important to understand the statutory classification punishment scheme in 
Illinois because plea bargaining and sentencing are inextricably linked in this jurisdiction.  Because Illinois is a 
determinate sentencing system, the prosecutor has great discretionary power to influence sentencing decisions 
through plea negotiations.4 
 
Felonies in Illinois are classified as either Class X – the most serious classification – Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, or 
Class 4.5  Offenders convicted of Class X felonies, first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, or any other 
pre-specified offenses cannot be sentenced to probation or any other nonincarcerative sentences.  For Class X 
felonies, judges must sentence the offender to a minimum prison sentence of six years.  The minimum and 
maximum terms of imprisonment for the five classifications of felonies are: 6-30 years (Class X); 4-15 years (Class 
1); 3-7 years (Class 2); 2-5 years (Class 3); 1-3 years (Class 4).  Judges cannot reduce the minimum required 
sentences unless they find that at least one statutorily defined mitigating circumstance exists.6   
 
Given the literature on plea bargaining practices and the theoretical framework posed earlier, the following 
hypotheses are drawn:     
H: Race/ethnicity, sex, age, and employment status of the offender will be significantly related to the 
likelihood of receiving a count reduction in the borderline serious cases but not the least serious or 
most serious cases. 
 
H1  Black and Hispanic offenders will be less likely than White offenders to receive 
a count reduction in the borderline serious cases but not the least serious or most 
serious cases. 
H2 Male offenders will be less likely than female offenders to receive a count 
reduction in the borderline serious cases but not the least serious or most serious 
cases. 
H3  Younger offenders will be less likely than older offenders to receive a count 
reduction in the borderline serious cases but not the least serious or most serious 
cases. 
H4  Unemployed offenders will be less likely than employed offenders to receive a 
count reduction in the borderline serious cases but not the least serious or most 
serious cases. 
 
METHOD 
 
Data 
The current study is an analysis of secondary data collected as part of a larger project studying sentencing in three 
large urban counties in 1993:  Cook County (Chicago, IL), Dade County (Miami, FL), and Jackson County (Kansas 
City, MO).  The data were collected from court case files for formally charged felony cases in these three 
jurisdictions.  The current study uses only the Cook County data to examine the effect of offender characteristics on 
plea bargaining decisions because it included ethnicity and employment status.   
 
Sample 
The sample of cases used in the original study (N = 2,850 for Chicago only) was selected randomly from a list of all 
offenders who were convicted of at least one felony in 1993.  Those cases where the defendant did not plead guilty 
(N = 272) are eliminated from the current study for the purposes of examining plea bargaining decisions.  Thus, the 
analysis includes 2,578 offenders who pled guilty to at least one felony in 1993.  In the original study, Chicago was 
selected for its high racial minority population7 and employment status, which allows for the opportunity to test the 
proposed hypotheses. 
                                                 
4
 As of the collection of this data in 1993, Illinois did not have a system of regulating prosecutor’s initial or 
subsequent charging decisions. 
5
 See the Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated (720 ILCS 570/401 (1996)) for elaborated definitions of offenses and 
penalties. 
6
 This requirement is only true for prison sentences.  Probation is an option for all classifications except for Class X. 
7
 For this reason, the percentage of Black defendants (81%) is unusually high. 
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In order to test the integrated theoretical perspective for potential differential treatment in plea bargaining decisions, 
it is necessary to partition the data by case seriousness and perform separate multivariate analyses for each 
partitioned group.  Previous studies have not identified such a three-tiered scheme; therefore, the current study 
explores this technique.  The current study partitions the data into three categories of case seriousness:  most serious, 
borderline serious, and least serious.  Because sentences in Illinois in 1993 were defined in a determinate 
classification scheme, these groups are defined as follows:  “most serious” includes Class X offenses, “borderline 
serious” includes Class 1 offenses, “least serious” includes Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4 offenses.  These 
classifications were determined based on the potential maximum punishment.  For the “most serious” classification, 
the defendant could likely face 30 years in prison.  For the “borderline serious” classification, the defendant could 
likely face 15 years, whereas offenders in the “least serious” partition could only face a maximum of 7 years. 
 
Variables 
The dependent variable utilized for this project was the likelihood of receiving a count reduction.  More specifically, 
the analyses are centered on whether the number of charges is reduced or not.  For example, if a defendant was 
initially charged with three current offenses but was only convicted of one offense, then this defendant received a 
count reduction.  Cases with only one original charge were eliminated from this analysis since the sample only 
included defendants who pled guilty.  Cases with only one original charge could not be reduced and, thus, were not 
included in this analysis.   
 
The project utilizes several independent variables to predict the likelihood of receiving a count reduction.  There are 
three general categories of independent variables outlined in this research:  offender characteristics8, case 
characteristics,9 and case processing characteristics.  Offender characteristics include race/ethnicity, sex, age, 
employment status, and number of prior felony convictions.  The variables and their codes and frequencies are 
presented in Table 1.   
 
[Insert Table1 here] 
 
Case characteristics include type of primary charge filed,10 number of current charges filed, and whether a weapon 
was used or not.  The likelihood of count reductions might be influenced by the number charges filed and the type of 
primary charge filed by the prosecutor given his/her perception of dangerousness as predicted by the focal concerns 
theory.  An offender with more charges filed and/or with a more serious primary charge filed would be classified as 
more dangerous and, theoretically, would be less likely to gain a plea bargain.  Due to low variability, the number of 
charges filed is recoded into a dichotomous measure – 2 charges and 3 or more charges.  Finally, whether a weapon 
was used in the charged offense would, again, indicate a more dangerous offender and, therefore, reduce the 
likelihood of the offender receiving a negotiated guilty plea.   
 
Case processing characteristics address the systemic factors that may impact decisions within the court.  These 
factors include type of defense attorney (public or private), pretrial release status, and whether the defendant was 
under state control at the time of the arrest.  Some suggest that defendants with a public defense attorney receive 
harsher penalties than those with a private defense attorney (see Chiricos & Bales, 1991; Spohn, 2002).  Pretrial 
release status is defined as whether the defendant gained a release or not.  Those who are not released are often 
treated more harshly (Sorensen & Wallace, 1999; Spohn & Cederblom, 1991).  Finally, the state control of the 
defendant is measured by whether the defendant was on probation/parole or not at the time of the arrest.  Those who 
are on probation or parole are likely not to receive a count reduction compared to those who are not on probation or 
parole at the time of the arrest.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Although past research has identified a possible interaction effect between race and sex of the offender (see Spohn 
& Holleran, 2000), the data for the current study do not support such an analysis.  
9
 There are no strength of evidence or victim characteristic variables included in the original study.  It is presumed, 
though, that the strength of evidence would have already been considered during the initial screening process. 
10
 Charge type is coded as a dummy variable.  Both “murder” and “rape” are omitted as the reference category 
because the low number of murder cases. 
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Analytical Procedures 
To measure the effect of offender characteristics on plea bargaining, the current study employs a logistic regression 
analysis.11  Logistic regression is used for analyses examining dependent variables that are dichotomous (see 
Aldrich & Nelson, 1984; Menard, 2002).  The current project uses logistic regression for analyzing the effect of 
offender characteristics on the likelihood of count reduction – a dichotomous dependent variable.  More specifically, 
a backward selection logistic regression is run in which all of the theoretically relevant independent variables are 
included initially.  Insignificant variables are then removed one at a time until all of the variables in the model are 
statistically significant (p<.10).12  By completing a backwards selection logistic regression, the current research can 
eliminate the insignificant variables.  By including insignificant variables in the model, the fit of the model increases 
just simply adding a variable to the model – whether significant or not. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 2 presents the frequency distributions disaggregated by case seriousness.  The data indicate that count 
reductions are fairly evenly distributed.  The table indicates that 78.5% of the offenders in the most serious group 
received a count reduction, compared with 68.3% of the offenders in the borderline serious group and 73.5% of the 
offenders in the least serious group.  The typical offender in each group is an unemployed black male offender who 
was less than 35 years old and had no prior felony convictions.   
 
Direct Effects 
The results from the direct effects logistic regression model are summarized in Table 3 where no partitions are 
made.  The overall count reduction model is statistically significant (p < .10) with a proportional reduction in error 
of 0.156 (or, 15.6%).  None of the offender characteristics have a statistically significant relationship with the 
decision to reduce the number of charges, whereas the legally-relevant variables do have a statistically significant 
effect (p<.10).  Offenders who are facing three or more original charges are significantly more likely than those 
facing only two charges to receive a count reduction.  Offenders facing a violent or property offense are more likely 
to receive a count reduction than offenders facing a drug offense.  Finally, offenders facing a Class 3 or Class 4 
charge were less likely to receive a count reduction than offenders facing a Class X charge – the reference category.   
[ 
Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Partitioned Effects 
To test the proposed integrated theory, it is important to partition the data into three main categories of case 
seriousness:  most serious, borderline serious, and least serious.  The only model that was found to be statistically 
significant (p<.10) is the “least serious” model.  This least serious model has a proportional reduction in error of 
23% (Nagelkerke R2 = 0.230).  Table 4 indicates that none of the offender characteristics produced significant 
effects, whereas the legally-relevant factors are statistically significant predictors of whether an offender received a 
count reduction or not.    
  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Offenders who had two or more prior felony convictions or one prior felony conviction are less likely to receive a 
count reduction than those who had no prior felony convictions (p<.10).  Offenders facing a theft or motor vehicle 
theft charge are significantly more likely to receive a count reduction than offenders who face a robbery charge 
(p<.10).  Finally, offenders facing three or more current charges are more likely to receive a reduction of the number 
of charges than offenders facing only two current charges (p<.10). 
                                                 
11
 No multicollinear problems arose after examining the zero order correlation matrix.  Another test of 
multicollinearity is to calculate variance inflation factors (a more sensitive test).  One problem arose with the direct 
effects models where narcotics charges, other drug charges, and class variables resulted in high variance inflation 
factors.  After recoding the type of charge variable into more aggregate categories for the direct effects model, the 
calculation of variance inflation factors indicated no severe multicollinearity (VIF < 5) (Studenmund, 1997).   In 
fact, no variance inflation factors were higher than 3.  
12
 The probability level (p<.10) is chosen to avoid a Type II error.  Smaller samples can yield “false negatives” in 
predicting outcomes (see Bachman & Paternoster, 2004) 
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To address the importance of statistically significant variables, the current research standardizes these effects.  The 
standardized coefficient is calculated by multiplying the unstandardized coefficient by the standard deviation of the 
independent variable (D. W. Roncek, 1999).  The absolute values of the results of these computations and rank 
orders are summarized in Table 4 and indicate the most important significant variables relative to the other 
significant variables.  The most important variable in this model is the type of primary charge.  The results 
summarized in Table 9 indicate that offenders facing a theft charge is the most important variable (0.551), followed 
by the burglary charge (0.515) and the motor vehicle theft charge (0.447).  Therefore, the type of current charge has 
the most explanatory power in predicting the likelihood of receiving a count reduction. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Prosecutors have a substantial amount of discretionary power, which is often left unchecked.  This is potentially 
problematic, given that discretion can lead to disparate treatment within the criminal justice system (Walker, et al., 
2000).  Previous research has not studied determinants of count reduction decisions.  Since prosecutors have nearly 
unfettered discretion in negotiated guilty pleas, there is the possibility that legally irrelevant offender characteristics 
will influence decisions to reduce the number of charges. 
 
The current research hypothesized that plea bargaining decisions would be clearly determined by legally-relevant 
factors in the lowest level and highest level of case seriousness.  It was also hypothesized that plea bargaining 
decisions would not be clearly determined by legally-relevant factors and rely more on prosecutorial discretion in 
the medium level of case seriousness.  More specifically, it was hypothesized that Black/Hispanic, male, young, and 
unemployed offenders would be less likely to receive a count reduction in the borderline serious cases than white 
female older offenders who were employed at the time of the crime.   
 
The analyses suggest that no statistically significant relationships between offender characteristics and the likelihood 
of receiving a count reduction were found.  Finding nothing, however, is often finding something.  The results of 
this study suggest that prosecutors do not treat offenders differently in their decision to drop the number of charges 
based on the offenders’ race/ethnicity, sex, age, and employment status regardless of offense severity.  Instead, 
prosecutors rely primarily on legally-relevant factors – but only for the least serious cases.  Therefore, the hypothesis 
that offender characteristics impact the decision to reduce the number of charges in the borderline serious cases is 
not supported. 
 
There are a few possible explanations for the findings from this research.  First, prosecutors’ reliance on legally-
relevant variables may suggest that prosecutors do not attempt to circumvent the determinate sentencing scheme in 
Illinois through their plea bargaining power.  Although it is possible that prosecutors have the power to affect 
sentencing decisions through plea bargaining practices, the evidence from this study may indicate that prosecutors, 
for the most part, do so uniformly.  It is possible, though, that important distinctions may be made within each class 
of offense masking disparity within each partition.  The current study only examined potential disparities between 
partitions. 
 
Second, the effects of offender characteristics on plea bargaining decisions may be minimized by “straight pleas.”  
Defendants can plead guilty in the absence of any concessions given by the prosecutor.  They engage in such 
activities for a variety of reasons:  strong and convincing evidence against the offender; lack of support from their 
defense attorney; or the offenders’ personal regret or remorse.  This study did not control for “straight pleas,” which 
could explain the high number of guilty pleas that were not accompanied by a count reduction.   
 
“Symbolic bargaining” may also explain why offender characteristics did not significantly influence plea bargaining 
decisions.   
While some changes (a reduction of rape to battery or armed robbery to robbery) can be 
significant and have important sentencing implications, others may be symbolic or largely so (a 
reduction of burglary to larceny in a building or dropping three counts of theft in a four-count 
indictment) (Nardulli, et al., 1988, p. 214). 
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Having knowledge about whether a specific guilty plea is a result of a true bargain or a symbolic bargain could 
greatly improve the validity of the findings of this study.  Even though the current analyses did not produce evidence 
to suggest disparate treatment in prosecutors’ plea bargaining decisions, these disparities may be masked by 
symbolic bargaining. 
 
Another masking agent is the potential for prosecutors’ overcharging practices.  Overcharging is quite prominent for 
charge and/or count bargaining practices (see Shulhofer & Nagel, 1997).  It is unknown what the legitimate number 
of charges is to make an assessment about which defendants were more likely to receive a count reduction.  Without 
knowing the “real evidence” of the case, it is unclear as to whether an offender received a true plea bargain or 
whether the guilty plea was a result of a “markup” during the initial charging phase.  Again, disparities may be 
masked because certain groups of offenders may have received a “markup” reduction as opposed to a “true” 
reduction. 
 
Although this study is one of the few studies to explore plea bargaining decisions in a systematic way, there are a 
few limitations.  First, there was no data on straight pleas and strength of evidence.  Without appropriate knowledge 
about why defendants choose to plead guilty without these concessions, research cannot conclude which cases truly 
received a count reduction and which cases did not.  For all intents and purposes, offenders who did not receive a 
count reduction may have pled guilty without consideration of a plea bargain.   
 
Strength of evidence may also relate to the validity of the reduction measures.  Previous research noted that the 
strength of evidence is an important factor when considering plea bargaining decisions (see Albonetti, 1992; 
Bernstein et al., 1977; Wilmot & Spohn, 2004).  It is important for future research to include strength of evidence 
which may have been considered in the charging phase and/or the plea negotiation phase.     
 
Finally, it is important to note that the data used for this study were collected from one jurisdiction – albeit a fairly 
large jurisdiction – in one state.  The external validity of this research project may be fairly limited.  It would be 
prudent to compare across similar jurisdictions in different states.  This research is also limited to state and local 
prosecutors; findings may differ in federal cases with federal prosecutors. 
 
Although the hypotheses tested in the current study were not confirmed, important differences may be masked by 
straight pleas and/or symbolic plea bargaining.  Therefore, it would be important to include measures on 
undercharging and overcharging practices and measures on trial convictions to cover straight guilty plea decisions.   
 
One final consideration for future research is to examine potential disparities as a cumulative effect across the 
system.  As Blumstein and his associates (1987) have noted, much of the research in this area examined disparities 
at independent decision points of the criminal justice system.  They argued that research should, rather, concentrate 
on examining how disparate treatment at one stage can factor into a cumulative disparity effect across multiple 
stages.  Although little to no disparity was found in the plea bargaining stage in this study, researchers may find that 
disparity is prevalent at prior stages that might mask important differences not revealed in research concentrated on 
one stage of the criminal justice system.  It is important to examine possible cumulative effects across multiple 
stages of the criminal justice system. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Albonetti, C. A. (1987).  Prosecutorial discretion:  The effects of uncertainty.  Law and Society Review, 21, 291-313.  
 
Albonetti, C. A. (1990).  Race and the probability of pleading guilty.  Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 6, 315-
334.   
 
Albonetti, C. A. (1992).  Charge reduction:  An analysis of prosecutorial discretion in burglary and robbery cases.  
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 8, 317-333. 
 
Aldrich, J., & Nelson, F.  (1984).  Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models.  Beverly Hills, CA:  Sage. 
 
Bachman, R., & Paternoster, R. (2004).  Statistics for Criminology and Criminal Justice, (2nd Ed.).  Boston:  
McGraw Hill. 
 J. Ball in JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2006)  10 
 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in the Contemporary Criminal Justice, 22 2006.  SAGE Publications, 
Inc., All rights reserved.  Doi: 10.1177/1043986206292369 
 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in the Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 22(3) 2006.  SAGE 
Publications, Inc., All rights reserved.  doi: 10.1177/1043986206292369 
Baldus, D. C., Woodworth, G., & Pulaski, C. A.  (1990).  Equal Justice and the Death Penalty:  A Legal and 
Empirical Analysis.  Boston:  Northeastern University Press. 
 
Bernstein, I. N., Kick, E., Leung, J. T., & Schulz, B. (1977).  Charge reduction:  An intermediary stage in the 
process of labeling criminal defendants.  Social Forces, 56, 362-384 
. 
Blumstein, A., Cohen, J., Martin, S. E., & Tonry, M. H.  (Eds.).  (1983).  Research on Sentencing:  The Search for 
Reform (Vols. 1-2).  Washington, D.C.:  National Academy Press. 
 
Brereton, D., & Casper, J. (1981-1982).  Does it pay to plead guilty?  Differential sentencing and the functioning of 
the criminal courts.  Law & Society Review, 16, 45-70. 
 
Britt, C. L. (2000).  Social context and racial disparities in punishment decisions.  Justice Quarterly, 17, 707-732 
 
Chiricos, T. G., & Bales, W. D. (1991).  Unemployment and punishment:  An empirical assessment.  Criminology, 
29, 701-723.  
 
Eisenstein, J., Flemming, R. B., & Nardulli, P. F. (1988).  The contours of justice:  Communities and their courts.  
Boston:  Little, Brown. 
 
Farnworth, M., & Teske, R. H. C. (1995).  Gender differences in felony court processing:  Three hypotheses of 
disparity.  Women & Crime Justice, 6(2), 23-44. 
 
Figueira-McDonough, J. (1985).  Gender differences in informal processing:  A look at charge bargaining and 
sentence reduction in Washington, D. C.  Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 22¸ 101-133. 
 
Harrison, P., & Beck, A.  (2003).  Prisoners in 2003.  Washington, D.C.:  Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
 
Heumann, M. (1978).  Plea Bargaining:  The Experiences of Prosecutors, Judges, and Defense Attorneys.  Chicago:  
The University of Chicago Press 
. 
Johnson, B. D. (2003).  Racial and ethnic disparities in sentencing departures across modes of conviction.  
Criminology, 41, 449-490 
. 
Kellough, G., & Wortley, S. (2002).  Remand for plea:  Bail decisions and plea bargaining as commensurate 
decisions. 
 
Kalven, H., & Zeisel, H.  (1966).  The American Jury.  Boston:  Little, Brown and Company. 
 
Kersetter, W.  (1990).  Gateway to justice:  Police and prosecutorial response to sexual assaults against women.  
Criminology, 81, 267-313. 
 
LaFree, G. D.  (1980).  Variables affecting guilty pleas and convictions in rape cases:  Toward a social theory of 
rape processing.  Social Forces, 58, 833-850. 
 
LaFree, G. D.  (1985).  Adversarial and nonadversarial justice:  A comparison of guilty pleas and trials.  
Criminology, 23, 289-312. 
 
McDonald, W. F. (1985).  Plea Bargaining:  Critical Issues and Common Practices.  U.S. Department of Justice:  
National Institute of Justice 
 
Menard, S.  (2002).  Applied Logistic Regression Analysis.  Thousand Oaks, CA:  Sage. 
 
Meyer, J. A., & Gray, T. (1997).  Drunk drivers in the courts:  Legal and extra-legal factors affecting pleas and 
sentences.  Journal of Criminal Justice, 25, 155-163. 
 
 J. Ball in JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2006)  11 
 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in the Contemporary Criminal Justice, 22 2006.  SAGE Publications, 
Inc., All rights reserved.  Doi: 10.1177/1043986206292369 
 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in the Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 22(3) 2006.  SAGE 
Publications, Inc., All rights reserved.  doi: 10.1177/1043986206292369 
Miethe, T. D., & Moore, C. A. (1986).  Racial differences in criminal processing:  The consequences of model 
selection on conclusions about differential treatment.  The Sociological Quarterly, 27, 217-237. 
 
Nardulli, P., Eisenstein, J., & Flemming, R. B. (1988).  The Tenor of Justice, Urbana, IL:  University of Illinois 
Press. 
 
Schulhofer, S. J., & Nagel, I. H. (1997).  Plea negotiations under the federal sentencing guidelines:  Guideline 
circumvention and its dynamics in the post-Mistretta period.  Northwestern University Law Review, 91, 
1284-1316. 
Sorensen, J., & Wallace, D. H. (1999).  Prosecutorial discretion in seeking death:  An analysis of racial disparity in 
this pretrial stages of case processing in a midwestern county.  Justice Quarterly, 16, 559-578. 
 
Spohn, C. (2002).  How Do Judges Decide?  The Quest for Fairness and Justice in Sentencing.  Thousand Oaks, 
CA:  Pine Forge Press. 
 
Spohn, C., Beichner, D., & Davis-Frenzel, E.  (2001).  Prosecutorial justifications for sexual assault case rejection:  
Guarding the “gateway to justice.”  Social Problems, 48, 206-235 
. 
Spohn, C., & Cederblom, J.  (1991).  Race and disparities in sentencing :  A test of the liberation hypothesis.  Justice 
Quarterly, 8, 305-327. 
 
Spohn, C., & Holleran, D. (2000).  The imprisonment penalty paid by young, unemployed black and Hispanic male 
offenders.  Criminology, 38, 281-306. 
 
Spohn & Holleran (2001).  Prosecuting sexual assault:  A comparison of charging decisions in sexual assault cases 
involving strangers, acquaintances, and intimate partners.  Justice Quarterly, 18, 651-688. 
 
Steffensmeier, D., & Demuth, S. (2000).  Ethnicity and sentencing outcomes in U.S. federal courts:  Who is 
punished more harshly?  American Sociological Review, 65, 705-729. 
 
Steffensmeier, D., Ulmer, J., &  Kramer, J.  (1998).  The interaction of race, gender, and age, in criminal sentencing:  
The punishment cost of being young, black, and male.  Criminology, 36, 763-797. 
 
Studenmund, A. H.  (1997).  Using Econometrics:  A Practical Guide, (3rd ed.).  Reading, MA:  Addison-Wesley.  
 
Sudnow, D.  (1965).  Normal crime.  Social Problems, 12, 254-264. 
 
Thomas, C. W., & Fitch, W. A. (1976).  Prosecutorial decision making.  The American Criminal Law Review, 13, 
507-559. 
 
Ulmer, J. T. (1997).  Social Worlds of Sentencing:  Court Communities Under Sentencing Guidelines.  Albany, NY:  
State University of New York Press. 
 
Ulmer, J. T., & Kramer, J. H. (1996).  Court communities under sentencing guidelines:  Dilemmas of formal 
rationality and sentencing disparity.  Criminology, 34, 383-407 
 
Voit, E. S.  (1987).  Formal, Substantive, and Ascriptive Determinants of Prosecutorial Decisions and Their Effects 
on Case Outcomes in the Criminal Justice Process.  Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University. 
(dissertation).  
 
Walker, S. (1998).  Sense and Nonsense About Crime and Drugs:  A Policy Guide (4th Ed.).  Belmont, CA:  
Wadsworth. 
 
Walker, S., Spohn, C., & DeLone, M. (2000).  The Color of Justice:  Race Ethnicity and Crime in America (2nd Ed.).  
Belmont, CA:  Wadsworth. 
 
 J. Ball in JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2006)  12 
 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in the Contemporary Criminal Justice, 22 2006.  SAGE Publications, 
Inc., All rights reserved.  Doi: 10.1177/1043986206292369 
 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in the Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 22(3) 2006.  SAGE 
Publications, Inc., All rights reserved.  doi: 10.1177/1043986206292369 
Wilmot, K. A., & Spohn, C. (2004).  Prosecutorial discretion and real-offense sentencing:  An analysis of relevant 
conduct under the federal sentencing guidelines.  Criminal Justice Policy Review, 15, 324-343. 
 
Wooldredge, J., & Griffin, T.  (2005).  Displaced discretion under Ohio sentencing guidelines.  Journal of Criminal 
Justice, 33, 301-316. 
 
Wooldredge, J., & Thistlethwaite, A. (2004).  Bilevel disparities in court dispositions for  intimate assault.  
Criminology, 42, 417-456. 
 
 J. Ball in JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2006)  13 
 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in the Contemporary Criminal Justice, 22 2006.  SAGE Publications, 
Inc., All rights reserved.  Doi: 10.1177/1043986206292369 
 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in the Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 22(3) 2006.  SAGE 
Publications, Inc., All rights reserved.  doi: 10.1177/1043986206292369 
Figure 1.  Illustration of the Integrated Theoretical Perspective 
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Table 1.  Dependent and Independent Variables:  Codes and Frequencies 
Variable  Code N %  
 Dependent Variable     
 Counts Reduced 1=yes 599 74.3  
   0=no 207 25.7  
       
Independent Variables     
    Offender characteristics     
 Race/ethnicity     
  Black  2087 81.0  
  Hispanic  267 10.4  
  White  224 8.7  
       
 Sex 1=male 2335 90.6  
   0=female 243 9.4  
       
 Age 0=24 years or younger 1195 46.4  
  1=25-34 years 914 35.5  
  2=35 years or older 469 18.2  
       
 Employment Status 1=unemployed 1629 72.9  
   0=employed 607 27.1  
       
 Prior Felony Convictions 0=zero convictions 1096 42.5  
  1=one conviction 760 29.5  
  2=two or more convictions 722 28.0  
    Case Characteristics     
 Most Serious Charge Filed     
  Murder  52 2.0  
  Rape  29 1.1  
  Robbery  200 7.8  
  Aggravated Assault  22 0.9  
  Burglary  328 12.7  
  Weapons Offense  143 5.5  
  Larceny/theft  124 4.8  
  Motor Vehicle Theft  169 6.6  
  Possession of Narcotics with Intent  755 29.3  
  Other Drug Offenses  628 24.4  
  Other Felony Offenses  128 5.0  
 
 Class of Primary Charge Filed     
  Class X  267 10.4  
  Class 1  444 17.2  
  Class 2  879 34.1  
  Class 3  346 13.4  
  Class 4  642 24.9  
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Variable  Code N %  
 Weapon Use 1=yes 383 15.3  
   0=no 2124 84.7  
      
 Number of Charges Filed 1=one charge 1772 68.7  
   2=two charges 537 20.8  
   3=three or more charges 269 10.4  
       
    Case Processing Characteristics     
 Type of Public Defense Attorney 0=public 2393 92.8  
   1=private 185 7.2  
       
 Pretrial Status 1=in custody 1616 62.7  
   0=released 962 37.3  
       
 Under State Control (on 1=yes 509 19.7  
   0=no 2069 80.3  
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Table 2.  Dependent and Independent Variables:  Codes and Frequencies by Case Type 
    Most Serious  Borderline 
Serious 
 Least 
Serious 
    N %  N %  N % 
Dependent Variables          
 Counts Reduced          
  Yes  117 78.5  82 68.3  275 73.5 
  No  32 21.5  38 31.7  99 26.5 
Independent Variables          
Offender Characteristics          
 Race/ethnicity          
  Black  174 81.3  305 82.4  1396 82.6 
  Hispanic  13 6.1  35 9.5  161 9.5 
  White  27 12.6  30 8.1  134 7.9 
 Sex          
  Male  197 92.1  342 92.4  1545 91.4 
  Female  17 7.9  28 7.6  146 8.6 
 Age          
  24 years or younger  115 53.7  193 52.2  783 46.3 
  25-34 years old  67 31.3  125 33.8  597 35.3 
  35 years or older  32 15.0  52 14.1  311 18.4 
 Employment Status          
  Unemployed  128 69.6  260 77.4  1085 73.7 
  Employed  56 30.4  76 22.6  387 26.3 
 Prior Felony Convictions          
  Zero Convictions  92 43.0  153 41.4  685 40.5 
  One Conviction  60 28.0  127 34.3  495 29.3 
  Two or More Convictions  62 28.2  90 24.3  511 30.2 
Case Characteristics          
 Murder Charge           
  Yes  49 22.9       
  No  165 77.1       
 Robbery Charge          
  Yes  86 40.2     93 5.5 
  No  128 59.8     1598 94.5 
 Burglary Charge          
  Yes     82 22.2  245 14.5 
  No     288 77.8  1446 85.5 
 Theft Charge          
  Yes        121 7.2 
  No        1570 92.8 
 Motor Vehicle Theft Charge          
  Yes        135 8.0 
  No        1556 92.0 
 Weapons Charge          
  Yes        130 7.7 
  No        1561 92.3 
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Table 2.  (cont.) 
    Most Serious  Borderline 
Serious 
 Least 
Serious 
    N %  N %  N % 
 Narcotics Charge          
  Yes  79 36.9  288 77.8  388 22.9 
  No  135 63.1  82 22.2  1303 77.1 
 Other Drugs Charge          
  Yes        579 34.2 
  No        1112 65.8 
 Number of Charges Filed          
  One Charge  65 30.4  250 67.6  1317 77.9 
  Two Charge  65 30.4  103 27.8  296 17.5 
  Three or More Charge  84 39.3  17 4.6  78 4.6 
 Weapon Use          
  Yes  67 33.0  4 1.1  174 10.5 
  No  136 67.0  356 98.9  1477 89.5 
Case Processing Characteristics          
 Type of Defense Attorney          
  Public  182 85.0  337 91.1  1614 95.4 
  Private  32 15.0  33 8.9  77 4.6 
 Pretrial Status          
  In Custody  175 81.8  238 64.3  1028 60.8 
  Released  39 18.2  132 35.7  663 39.2 
 
Under State Control          
 
 On Probation/parole  35 16.4  80 21.6  356 21.1 
 
 Not on Probation/parole  179 83.6  290 78.4  1335 78.9 
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Table 3.  Logistic Regression:  Count Reduction Model (Direct Effects)  
 b Sig. Odds Ratio | b(σx) | 
Type of Primary Charge Filed 
(“drug charge” is reference category)     
          Violent charge 0.476 0.071 1.610 0.365 (3) 
          Property charge 1.123 0.000 3.073 0.861 (1) 
Number of Charges Filed 
(“2 charges filed” is reference category)     
          3 or more charges filed 1.295 0.000 3.652 0.396 (2) 
Class of Primary Charge Filed 
(“Class X” is reference category)     
          Class 3 charge -0.577 0.043 0.562 0.197 (5) 
          Class 4 charge -0.695 0.097 0.499 0.301 (4) 
Constant 0.418    
Number of cases 689    
Nagelkerke R2 0.156    
-2 Log Likelihood (goodness of fit) 693.48*    
All variables listed are statistically significant (p < .10)    
*p < .10     
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Table 4.  Logistic Regression:  Count Reduction Model (Least Serious Cases) 
 b Sig. Odds Ratio | b(σx) | 
Prior Felony Convictions  
(“0 felony convictions” is reference 
category) 
    
          One prior felony conviction -0.559 0.090 0.572 0.254 (6) 
          Two or more prior felony convictions -0.869 0.011 0.419 0.399 (4) 
Type of Primary Charge Filed 
(“robbery” is reference category)     
          Burglary charge 1.463 0.000 4.4320 0.515 (2) 
          Theft charge 2.138 0.043 8.485 0.551 (1) 
          Motor vehicle theft charge 1.648 0.000 5.197 0.447 (3) 
Number of Charges Filed 
(“2 charges filed” is reference category)     
          3 or more charges filed 1.290 0.004 3.634 0.271 (5) 
Constant 0.614    
Number of cases 332    
Nagelkerke R2 0.230    
-2 Log Likelihood (goodness of fit) 328.750*    
All variables listed are statistically significant (p < .10)    
*p < .10     
 
 
